Of Rainbows and Rivers:  Lessons for Telecommunications Spectrum Policy from Transitions in Property Rights and Commons in Water Law by Thompson, Dale B
Of Rainbows and Rivers: Lessons for Telecommunications Spectrum Policy from 
Transitions in Property Rights and Commons in Water Law
by 
 
Dale B. Thompson*
William Mitchell College of Law
Saint Paul, MN  55105
As of September 2005:
Saint Cloud State University Department of Economics
Saint Cloud, MN  56301
July 12, 2005
Abstract:
A number of industries utilize the telecommunications spectrum to provide billions of dollars of 
services.  However, some have noted that technological development and implementation of spectrum 
applications have not progressed as fast in the United States as in other parts of the world  To improve 
technological development, many have recommended significant changes in United States policy of 
allocating spectrum, some based on a “property rights” approach, and others based on a “commons” 
approach. This article takes a novel approach to this problem, by applying lessons from our two hundred 
year history of water law to spectrum policy.  Also, instead of analyzing static characteristics of property 
systems, this article changes its focus to examine transitions in these systems.  Based on a new 
classification of property, “marketable commons property,” this article presents a solution to the 
allocation of spectrum: spectrum commons accounts (SCA).
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Some of our most important new technologies involve the use of the telecommunications 
spectrum. Cellular telephones, wireless internet service, cordless telephones, baby monitors: these all 
use some portion of the telecommunications spectrum to provide billions of dollars of services.  
Until recently, interest in the telecommunications spectrum was confined primarily to television 
and radio broadcasts, ham radio operators, and military and public service (police, fire, and ambulance) 
uses. With these limited uses, the United States chose to allocate the telecommunications spectrum 
through decisions of a regulatory agency, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). While many 
criticized this allocation system,1 it nonetheless continued to be used up until the late 1990s.
With the development of recent technologies, many, including the FCC itself, realized that 
another approach was necessary. In response, the FCC auctioned off a portion of unallocated spectrum.2
Auctions conducted between 1994 and 1996 raised revenues of approximately $20 billion.3  A rationale 
of these auctions was to increase the development of new technologies that utilize the 
telecommunications spectrum, by opening up new frequencies to new uses. The revenue generated 
indicates how valuable these technologies are expected to be.  However, despite the availability of these 
new frequencies, many believed that these auctions were insufficient to meet the rising demand for 
frequencies.  This demand was both caused by recent innovations, and needed for additional 
technological progress.  As one technology writer noted, technological development utilizing the 
spectrum has not progressed as fast in the United States as in other parts of the world:  “[U.S.] policies 
… have … allowed Asia – Japan in particular – to not only catch up in the development and expansion 
of broadband and mobile phone technology, but to roundly pound us into the dirt.”4
As a result, a new debate has raged over spectrum.  To improve technological development, 
many have recommended significant changes in allocating spectrum, some based on a “property rights” 
approach, and others based on a “commons” approach.5
1 See for instance, Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1959).
2 See John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 145 (1994); and Teresa Riordan, FCC’s Auction 
Draws Rich Bids, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1994, at D1, cited in Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the 
Design of the Law, 38 J. L. & ECON.  393, 421 (1995).
3 See Peter Cramton, The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions, 41 J. L. & ECON. 727 (1998).
4
 Dan Mitchell, A Broadband Beat-Down, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at C1.  This article goes on to state, 
“Japan, South Korea and other Asian countries are poised to leap ahead of the United States in any number of 
areas: teleconferencing, telecommuting, remote medical services, distance education, multimedia entertainment.” 
Id.
5
 For more, see section III, infra.
2This article takes a novel approach to this problem, by applying lessons from our two hundred 
year history of water law to spectrum policy.  Also, instead of analyzing static characteristics of property 
systems, this article changes its focus to examine transitions in these systems.  Based on a new 
classification of property, “marketable commons property,”6 this article presents a solution to the 
allocation of spectrum: spectrum commons accounts (SCA).  
This novel approach is closely related to the “Property Rights versus Commons” debate over 
spectrum.7  Some favor a “property rights” approach, whereby spectrum is put to its highest valued 
purposes by permitting those who value spectrum the highest to purchase the right to use a portion of the 
spectrum from the “owner” of the property right to that portion.  This approach works well for spectrum 
technologies, such as financial market transaction technologies, that suffer significant losses if they are 
interfered with.  The property rights approach addresses this by limiting the use of a specific frequency 
to only the owner of that frequency.
Others instead favor a “commons” approach, whereby a specific portion of spectrum is shared by 
a number of users in such a manner as to permit most if not all of these users to achieve their purposes 
for use of spectrum.   This approach works well for spectrum technologies that depend on a multitude of 
different inventors designing different applications that are less susceptible to interference problems, but 
also have little financing necessary to purchase the exclusive right to utilize a frequency.  One example 
has been the rapid advances in technology for wireless computer networks, where a number of different 
inventors have developed different applications for wireless networks, all utilizing the same frequency.
In the end, this debate is all about the encouragement of technological development.  Commons 
advocates believe that the commons approach is the way to achieve technological change, while 
property rights advocates believe that the protection of exclusive property rights is needed to properly 
advance technology.  This is an important question whose answer provides a link to a multi-billion 
dollar market.  Answering this question also involves better understanding the process of technological 
development, along with the role of risk and uncertainty.8
6 See Table 1 and section I, infra.
7 The structure of this debate is similar to other “Commons versus Property Rights” debates over file-sharing 
technologies, the internet, and the copyright extension act. For instance, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001).  See also Brett 
M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 Minn. L.R. 917 (2005) 
[linking analysis of infrastructure resources with the commons approach, and identifying characteristics that lead 
to improved management through a commons approach]. 
8
 For more, see section VI.C.
3Until now, this debate has missed an important consideration: the ability of a property system to 
adapt to changes. The choice of a commons approach or a property rights approach is in essence a 
selection of a system for managing telecommunications spectrum as property. One thing that has been 
clear over the history of property law is the need for a property system to adapt to changed 
circumstances. Our analysis of future interests has led to modifications of the application of a number of 
rules that have perplexed lawyers for hundreds of years: for instance, in most jurisdictions, the infamous 
“Rule in Shelley’s Case” no longer applies.9 Also, copyright law has adapted from its initial application 
to works reproduced by printing presses, to works reproducible by photocopying machines, and now as 
digital media. Consequently, the desirability of a particular property system may depend heavily on its 
ability to adapt to new circumstances.
One of the reasons for this lack of attention is the inherent difficulty of analyzing a property 
system’s adaptability before-the-fact: how can you know how a commons system will adapt to changed 
circumstances if you do not know what these new circumstances will be? While we cannot see into the 
future, we can examine the past. Although there is a very limited history of commons and property 
rights for telecommunications spectrum, there are other property resources with a lengthy history of 
allocating that resource through both a commons approach and a property rights approach.
One such resource, water, shares many characteristics with telecommunications spectrum.  While
we have had very limited experience with commons and property rights approaches for spectrum, we 
have approximately two hundred years of experience with these approaches for water rights.  The 
similarities between spectrum and water suggest that we can make predictions about the future 
adaptability of property systems for telecommunications spectrum by analyzing our past experiences 
with water rights.10
This article examines our experiences with using commons and property rights approaches to 
allocate water resources. In the United States, water law doctrine is split into two approaches: “riparian” 
[utilized primarily in Eastern states] and “prior appropriations” [utilized primarily in Western states].  
This article explains how riparian doctrine for water rights is essentially a commons approach, while 
prior appropriations doctrine is a property rights approach.  It then examines significant lessons from our 
9
 JESSE DUKEMINIER AND JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY, 5th ed., 300 (2002).
10
 Lueck, supra note 2, examines first possession doctrine under both water law and telecommunications 
spectrum, in addition to first possession of chattels, homesteading, adverse possession, mining, and intellectual 
property.  However, his examination of spectrum focuses primarily on the early history of spectrum allocation 
(1920-1927), with some discussion of the recent auctions.  See id., at 419.
4approximately two-hundred year history of water rights, and applies these lessons to 
telecommunications spectrum.
To aid with analysis, this article presents a new classification for property.  In an earlier article,11
Carol Rose suggested a third classification for property, “inherently public property,” in addition to 
commons and property rights classifications.  Inherently public property is essentially property that is 
held by private individuals with an option to convert the private property into a commons held by the 
government.  For instance, real property is subject to the power of eminent domain, whereby the 
government can convert property formerly held as private property into property held as commons (for 
use by the government for the good of the public).  This article extends Rose’s framework to include a 
new classification, “marketable commons property.”   Marketable commons property is essentially 
property that is held as a commons, but with an option to convert it into property held privately.12  This 
option essentially “completes the square” as a fourth option:
Primary Owner: Private Primary Owner: Public 
No Option Held Property Rights Commons
Inherent Option Held Inherently Public Marketable Commons
Table 1: Classifications of Property
The lessons from water law suggest that internal contradictions within a property rights approach 
to spectrum may lead to transitions in the form of this property system to one that is not envisioned by 
current advocates of the property rights approach.  In a similar manner, external forces may change a 
commons property system for spectrum into one that is not envisioned by current advocates of this 
approach.  What is needed is a mechanism that responds well to transitions.
More recent developments in water law suggest an alternative property structure for spectrum to 
manage both these internal contradictions and external forces. This article labels this structure a 
“spectrum commons account” (SCA), and it is a form of marketable commons property.  With a SCA, 
frequencies are available for use as a commons.  When certain conditions are met, there remains an 
option to convert a particular frequency into one held as private property.  
The advantage of an SCA is that initially, it enables significant innovation by a multitude of 
inventors, because the frequency is available as a commons.  Moreover, if one of these technologies 
becomes very valuable but is susceptible to problems with interference that can affect a commons 
frequency, there remains an option to convert the commons frequency into private property.  
11 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
12
 For more on options, see Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399 (2005).
5Consequently, a SCA achieves the best of both worlds: it enables large scale innovation as under a 
commons, but it also enables development of technologies that are extremely valuable but susceptible to 
interference, as would occur under a property rights approach.
After this introduction, the article begins with some foundational material on property 
classifications.  It then presents some background on the technological aspects of spectrum, including 
our recent experiences.  Following this, the article reviews the commons versus property rights debate 
for spectrum.13  Next, it briefly describes the riparian and prior appropriations doctrines for water law.  
After that, it discusses the strong similarities between water resources and spectrum, between a 
commons approach and riparian doctrine, and between a property approach and prior appropriations 
doctrine.  Drawing on these, it concludes by developing lessons for spectrum by analyzing our history 
with water law.  In so doing, this article presents a novel approach to designing a property system for 
telecommunication spectrum that provides strong incentives to innovate extremely valuable new 
technologies under a wide range of circumstances.
I. Classifications for Property, and a New Classification:  “Marketable Commons 
Property”
In many analyses, property can be classified under either a commons approach or a property 
rights approach.  Under a commons approach, property is held by the public and all have the right to 
utilize that property.  Under a property rights approach, property is held by a limited set of individuals, 
and an essential component of the property right is the right to exclude others from the use of that 
property.14  These diametrically opposed approaches have generated a number of debates.  For instance, 
there is a significant debate over whether future development of the internet should be under a commons 
13 In this literature, many advocates of these approaches do not advocate completely one-sided approaches to 
spectrum.  For instance, as discussed further below, property rights advocates sometimes suggest schemes that are 
predominately property-rights based, but include minor “commons”-based components.  And commons advocates 
sometimes suggest that initially, only a larger portion of the spectrum be allocated as commons.  In this article, 
rather than considering transitions involving these more complex schemes, we will instead consider transitions 
involving systems based solely on the commons approach, or based solely on the property rights approach.  This 
is necessary because the responses to transitional forces by these more complex systems depends on the details of 
their implementation, and at this point, the details of these recommended mixed-approach systems are 
insufficiently developed.  On the other hand, we can develop predictions as to how systems based completely on 
one of the approaches will respond to these transitional forces, and so that is what we do in this article.
14 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982); Penn Central Transportation 
Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) [dissent by Rehnquist, J.]; and Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
6approach or under a property rights approach.15  Recently, this debate has also played out in our analysis 
of copyright.  This debate underlies the arguments of the two sides in Eldred v. Ashcroft16 about the 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998.17  It has also played a significant role in the cases about file-
sharing technologies, Napster and Grokster.18
In “The Comedy of the Commons,”19 Carol Rose noted that there were certain types of property 
that did not fit within the classifications of either property rights or commons.  For instance, while water 
rights are typically held by private individuals, these rights are limited by “public trust” rights that are 
held by the public.20  Also, while copyrights are held by individuals, these rights are also limited by the 
“fair use” doctrine.21  Also, real estate rights are similarly limited by the eminent domain right held by 
the government.  Rose suggested that these property regimes did not fit neatly into either “commons” or 
“property rights” classifications.  Instead, Rose suggested a new category:  “inherently public property.”  
Inherently public property is property that is primarily held by individuals with certain rights reserved to 
the public.  
This article takes this concept and twists it to suggest another classification for property:  
“marketable commons property.”  Marketable commons property is property that is primarily held as 
commons, with certain rights reserved to individuals.  In the case of a SCA, there will exist an option so 
that under certain circumstances, an individual user of a commons frequency might convert that 
particular frequency into excludable property.  This instance of marketable commons property forms the 
basis of this article’s recommendations for telecommunications spectrum policy.
II. The Technology of Spectrum, and our Experience with Unlicensed Use
What is the telecommunications spectrum?  The spectrum refers to a collection of frequencies for 
conducting telecommunications.  Telecommunications occur when a radio wave is sent from a 
transmitter to a receiver.  Radio waves themselves are forms of electromagnetic radiation.  When they 
15 See Lessig, supra note 7.
16537 U.S. 186, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003).
17 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
18
 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); and MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 
and StreamCast Networks Inc., 2005 WL 1499402 (U.S.), 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (2005).
19
 Rose, supra note 11.
20 For more on “public trust,” see section V.A, infra.
21
 Fair use is a defense to copyright liability that arises generally for uses that are of a non-profit nature, utilize a 
less substantial portion of the original work, and have limited impact on the market for the original work.  See
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
7are generated, these waves oscillate at certain frequencies.  The telecommunications spectrum then is the 
collection of frequencies used for telecommunications, which is currently approximately three kilohertz 
(3 kHz, or 3000 cycles per second) to 300 gigahertz (300 GHz, or 300 billion cycles per second).22
Guglielmo Marconi discovered that a signal generated by a transmitter at a specific frequency 
could be captured by a receiver tuned to the same frequency as the transmitter.23  This enabled the 
separation of signals by putting them on different frequencies.24  However, this ability to receive the 
signal is sometimes compromised by interference.  Interference occurs when a receiver cannot identify 
the source transmission due to its receiving other transmissions generated at the same or close 
frequencies.
New developments in telecommunications have offered opportunities to combat interference.  
One is the use of spread-spectrum techniques.  Developed initially during World War II for “jamming 
resistance,”25 spread-spectrum utilizes signals sent over a wide range of frequencies but with lower 
power.  The likelihood of interfering with other transmissions is reduced as power is reduced.  Other 
new technologies for reducing the likelihood of interference include smart antennas and repeater 
networks.26
In addition with innovation in the technology behind telecommunications, we have also had 
innovations in the management of the spectrum.  One important innovation is the opening of certain 
parts of the spectrum (such as 900 MHz, 2.4 GHz, and 5GHz) to unlicensed use.  Because use is 
unlicensed in these frequencies, these frequencies essentially operate as a commons.27 The core of the 
22 See Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, United States Frequency Allocations: The 
Radio Spectrum (2003), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf.
23 See “The 7777 Wireless Patent,” available at http://www.sparkmuseum.com/BOOK_MARCONI.HTM.
24 See “Marconi Thanks the Newfoundland Government for Making Possible His Discovery of Radio 
Transmission,” available at http://www.raabcollection.com/detail.aspx?cat=6&subcat=140&man=213.
25
 BERNARD SKLAR, DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS: FUNDAMENTALS AND APPLICATIONS (2nd ed.) 
719 (2001).
26 See David P. Reed, How Wireless Networks Scale: The Illusion of Spectrum Scarcity, Presentation to the FCC 
Technological Advisory  Council (Apr. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.reed.com/OpenSpectrum/Spectrum%20capacity%20myth%20FCC%20TAC.ppt, cited in Kevin 
Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 863 (2004)..
27
 With these frequencies already marked as commons, the current debate can be understood as whether to extend 
additional frequencies to commons, or whether to operate them as property rights.  Taken to its extreme, the 
commons argument that technology could solve interference problems would suggest that (with the exception of 
whether certain frequencies – in particular the “beachfront property” currently used by television broadcast – that 
have considerably greater desirability than 900MHz and 2.4 GHz) the current availability of these frequencies as 
commons should be sufficient, which is clearly not the intent of commons advocates.
8commons versus property rights debate for telecommunication spectrum derives from our current 
experience with the telecommunication spectrum.  
At these unlicensed frequencies, all members of the public have the right to broadcast and 
receive transmissions, along with the right to design and sell equipment that broadcast and receive 
transmissions.  With free access, this enables inventors of new technologies the opportunity to develop 
their technologies knowing not only that they will have the right to sell equipment that utilize these 
frequencies, but also that the potential consumers of their equipment will also have the right to use this 
equipment to broadcast and receive transmissions.
These opportunities have led to significant innovations, in a wide array of applications.  Consider 
the 2.4 GHz band.  Microwave ovens used this frequency, and developed ways to more effectively heat 
food.28  Makers of cordless phones initially used frequencies around 50 MHz, and then began using 
900MHz to provide better quality and range.29  To further improve range and reduce interference from 
900MHz baby monitors,30 cordless phone manufacturers began using the 2.4 GHz range also.  
Completely new technologies also developed, that utilized this spectrum.  One was Bluetooth, for which 
one of the applications enables cell-phone users to receive calls to their cell-phone on their automobiles’ 
telephone system, which is presumed to be safer than holding the cell-phone while driving.  Another 
significant innovation using the 2.4 GHz range was the IEEE 802.11b and 802.11g standards for 
wireless local area networks.  These standards enabled manufacturers to develop very inexpensive 
equipment for operating wireless networks, and have been adopted by many businesses and many 
residential users also.  Advocates of the commons approach make a strong argument that this experience 
with unlicensed spectrum suggests that the commons approach is a better way to encourage innovation.
Nonetheless, this experience with unlicensed spectrum also provides evidence in support of the 
property rights approach.  The wide range of applications and users of equipment has led to significant 
problems with interference.  For instance, say Alice is using a 2.4 GHz cordless phone to talk with her 
brother, Bob.  While Alice is talking, her son, Carl, starts cooking popcorn in their microwave oven.  As 
a result, although unable to directly hear the sound of popcorn popping, Alice and Bob instead may now 
hear significant static on both of their phones, to the extent that they may have to wait until the popcorn 
28
 35th Annual Microwave Symposium, Microwave World (2000), available at
http://www.impi.org/publications/microwaveworld/MicrowaveWorld.pdf.
29
 Marshall Brain, How the Radio Spectrum Works (1998), available at
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/radio-spectrum.htm.
30 Id.
9is finished to resume their conversation.  This is because Alice’s cordless phone handset is receiving 
signals not only from the cordless phone base, but also from the microwave oven (which tends to emit a 
strong pulse).
Microwaves and cordless phones may also interfere with wireless networks.  This can be 
significantly problematic because of security concerns.  For instance, Michael has set up his wireless 
network at his residence to provide maximum security for communications between his laptop and his 
wireless router.  However, due to interference, his secure connection is lost.  However, unnoticed by 
Michael, another nearby wireless network (perhaps his neighbor’s) is available, and so his laptop 
automatically switches over to it.  However, this connection is now not secure, because otherwise he 
would not have been able to connect to it.  Consequently, although Michael had assumed that the 
financial transactions he was performing on his laptop were conducted through his secure wireless 
network, instead they are now broadcast over an unsecured network, and all of his data is susceptible of 
interception.
The successful innovation in this spectrum has greatly increased the potential for interference.  
As noted in a microwave oven industry research paper, “Never before have we had the potential for 
hundreds of millions of microwave devices interfereing [sic] with hundreds of millions of 
communications devices.  The potential for consumer dissatisfaction and complaints could become 
exceedingly costly for both the microwave and communications industries.”31  Even very sophisticated 
equipment is susceptible to these interference problems.32  As a result, advocates of the property rights 
approach will point to interference possibilities to oppose extending additional spectrum to commons.
III. A Brief history of the Property Rights versus Commons Debate
The primary approach for managing the telecommunications spectrum in the United States 
currently is through governmental control over licensing.  Governmental control arose out of the Radio 
31
 See Microwave World Symposium, supra note 28, at 31.
32
 Here is an anecdote from wireless professionals:  “I was personally a witness to a wireless 2.4 GHz data circuit 
trial, the $40,000 non-WiFi gear designed to be a T1/1.5 Mbps replacement at distances of a couple of miles. The 
distance for this particular installation was less than three blocks, call it under 300 feet, clear line-of-site between 
the two antennas. Most of the time, it worked fine, but the link would intermittently cut out in the mornings, 
afternoon, and evenings. After a week or two, the downtimes were mapped to the up times of the one site's 
microwave oven, a sturdy early '90s model. Needless to say, the gear got dumped and replaced with a glorified 
DSL connection.” Doug Mohney, "The cons and pros of 2.4GHz wireless connections," January 16, 2003, 
available at http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=7235.
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Act of 1927,33 which arose in response to problems with interference caused by the competing stations 
in the new broadcast industry.34  This legislation was updated by the Communications Act of 1934,35
which established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  Under this regime, the FCC 
“assigns” frequencies to licensees,36 who must then operate under certain technological and other 
regulations to prevent interference.  Licensees are not allowed to sell their licenses without FCC 
approval.37   This approach dominated the management of spectrum until the 1990s.
This approach came under attack by those who suggested that property rights would be a better 
way to manage the spectrum.  First proposed in an initially little noticed law review article by Leo 
Herzel in 1951,38 this idea was then famously expounded by Ronald Coase in the article “The Federal 
Communications Commission” which appeared in the Journal of Law & Economics in 1959.39  In this 
article, Coase argued that, just as with other resources, the pricing system and private property are 
significantly better ways to allocate spectrum frequencies.  Thirty-five years later, the FCC finally began 
to follow this recommendation when it auctioned a number of frequencies off during 1994 to 1996.
However, to many, the FCC had not gone far enough in following a property rights approach to 
spectrum.  In 1996, a conference on “The Law and Economics of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum” 
was held, with many of the presenters advocating the extension of additional frequencies to management 
by property rights.40  The organizer of this conference, Thomas Hazlett, later published another article in 
which he more forcefully argued for the adoption of the property rights mechanism to manage the 
telecommunications spectrum.41  Lawrence White42 and others43 also published articles calling for the 
use of the property rights approach for managing the entire telecommunications spectrum.
33
 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
34
 Coase, supra note 1, at 1-6.
35
 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.  §§ 151-
615b (2000)).
36
 47 U.S.C. § 303(c).
37
 47 C.F.R. § 73.3540(a) (2004).
38
 Leo Herzel, Comment, “Public Interest” and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 
802 (1951).
39
 Note 1, supra.
40
 Proceedings of this conference were published in a special issue of the Journal of Law & Economics, 41 J. 
LAW & ECON. 521 et seq. (1998).
41
 See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, 
and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J. LAW & 
TECH. 335 (2001).
42
 Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin, 9 
MEDIA L. & POL'Y (2000).
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However, at this same 1996 conference, another presenter, Eli Noam, called for a different 
approach to replacing government control over the spectrum.  Drawing on earlier suggestions by George 
Gilder and Paul Baran,44 Noam advocated the application of a commons mechanism for managing 
spectrum.45  Specifically, Noam recommended an open access system for spectrum in which “nobody 
would control any particular frequency,” and instead access would be granted to anyone paying a non-
discriminatory access fee.46  Yochai Benkler followed Noam with a number of articles offering 
arguments for the superiority of a commons approach to the property rights approach.47  In particular, 
Benkler pointed to the new technologies of spread-spectrum, smart receivers, and repeater networks that 
meant that spectrum was no longer “an independent and finite resource.”48
Additionally, drawing upon analogies to management of the internet, Lawrence Lessig in The 
Future of Ideas also began advocating the use of a commons approach to manage more of the 
telecommunication spectrum.49  Kevin Werbach has extended this approach to what he calls a 
“Supercommons,” in which management of telecommunications is not based on property principles but 
instead on reciprocal tort principles.50  Similar to Benkler, Werbach emphasizes the ability of new 
technologies to “avoid [interference] conflicts dynamically.”51
43
 See, for instance, Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications 
Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 82 (1999).
44
 George Gilder, The New Rule of Wireless, FORBES ASAP, Mar. 29, 1993, at 96; and Paul Baran, Visions of 
the 21st Century Communications: Is the Shortage of Radio Spectrum for Broadband Networks of the Future a 
Self Made Problem?, Keynote Address at the 8th Annual Conference on Next Generation Networks (Nov. 9, 
1994), available at
http://www.eff.org/Infrastructure/Wireless_cellular_radio/false_scarcity_baran_cngn94.transcript.
45
 Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's Anachronism. Taking the 
Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765 (1998).  For a critique of Noam’s recommendation, see
Thomas Hazlett, Spectrum Flash Dance: Eli Noam’s Proposal for ‘Open Access’ to Radio Waves, 41 J.L. & 
ECON. 805 (1998).
46
 Noam, supra note 45, at 777.  The access fee would fluctuate depending on congestion, but would not be 
different from one user to another.
47
 See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally Networked 
Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (1998); Yochai Benkler, VIACOM-CBS MERGER: From Consumers 
to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 561  (2000); and Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J. 
LAW & TECH. 25 (2002).
48
 Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, supra note 47 at 23.
49
 Lessig, supra note 7, does advocate a mixed approach of property and commons for spectrum.
50
 Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863 
(2004).
51 Id., at 902.
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There is an implication that due to technology, there may no longer face a shortage of spectrum.  
Property rights advocates strongly objected to this implication.  Hazlett argued that even though new 
developments can increase capacity of the telecommunications system, additional transmissions 
eventually lead to degradation.52  Hazlett then pointed to Say’s law (supply creates its own demand) 53 to 
demonstrate that the increased capacity would lead to the additional transmissions that would cause 
signal degradation.54
  Property rights and commons advocates again faced off at a conference held in 2003 at Stanford 
Law School, organized jointly by Lawrence Lessig and Thomas Hazlett.55  At this conference, among 
other papers, a paper by a former chief economist and a former chief technologist of the FCC, Gerald 
Faulhaber and David Farber, synthesized the property rights and commons approaches.56  One 
recommendation involved the use of public “parks” of spectrum frequencies within a system of 
otherwise private property controlled frequencies.  These parks would then operate as a commons with 
open access.  Another recommendation was the creation of a property rights regime combined with what 
they called a “non-interference easement.”  The non-interference easement would allow open access to 
spectrum frequencies as long as those open-access uses did not interfere with the uses operated by the 
holder of the property right for that frequency.  Despite these attempts to find a compromise, the debate 
continues.
Furthermore, a debate within the property rights versus commons debate concerns the 
applicability of treating the telecommunications spectrum as a natural resource.  This debate stretches 
back to Coase’s article, in which Coase made the argument that as a resource, spectrum should be 
allocated by markets.  In this article, Coase also made an analogy between land and spectrum.57
However, in the same article, Coase also emphasizes that the relevant property right to spectrum is a 
usufructuary right, not a right to materially own the resource:  “What does not seem to have been 
understood is that what is being allocated by the Federal Communications Commission … is the right to 
52
 Hazlett, Airwave Allocation Policy, supra note 41, at 488.
53
 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL AND ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS PRINCIPLES AND POLICY, 5th ed., 
851 (1991).
54
 Hazlett, Airwave Allocation Policy, supra note 41, at 489.
55
 Conference proceedings for “Spectrum Policy: Property or Commons?”, Stanford Law School, Stanford, CA 
(March 1 & 2, 2003).
56
 Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights, Markets, and the Commons;
later published in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO NEW 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 193 (2003).
57
 Coase used the land analogy to explain the problem of interference.  Coase, supra note 1, at 25.
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use a piece of equipment to transmit signals in particular way.”58  Some have interpreted this passage to 
imply that Coase “stated quite clearly that spectrum was not a physical resource.”59
Following Coase, Harvey Levin in “The Radio Spectrum Resource” argued strongly that proper 
management of spectrum required a better understanding of its nature as a resource.60  Christian Herter 
also made the case that spectrum was a natural resource.61  He concluded that because spectrum was a 
“‘scarce’” and “‘limited’” natural resource, “equitable and careful management … is crucial.”62  Even a 
commons advocate, Stuart Buck, argues that the analogy between spectrum and “land and other 
[common pool] resources” is strong.63
However, recently, the applicability of the analogy between spectrum and natural resources has 
come under direct attack. 64 In “Supercommons,” Kevin Werbach bluntly proclaims that the “basic 
analogy [of spectrum] to natural resources is flawed.”65   Werbach is particularly critical of analogies 
between spectrum and land,66 because “wireless communication works differently” than managing 
land.67  Werbach explains that what is important in spectrum policy is not management of a tangible, 
physical resource, but rather management of equipment that use that resource.68  To explain the 
problems that arise from analogies of spectrum to natural resources, Werbach himself presents a colorful 
analogy:  
58 Id., at 33.
59
 Werbach, supra note 50, fn. 110, at 884.
60
 Harvey Levin, The Radio Spectrum Resource, 11 J.L. & ECON. 433 (1968).  Levin followed this article with a 
book examining the management of spectrum as a resource.  HARVEY J. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE 
RESOURCE: USE AND REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM (1971).
61
 Christian A. Herter, Jr., The Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Critical Natural Resource, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
651 (1985).
62 Id., at 663.
63
 Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2 (2002).  
Buck draws significantly on the work of Elinor Ostrom on the management of common pool resources through 
commons.  See, for instance, ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).  For an another view of the difficulty of managing 
common pool resources through the commons, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles 
to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241 (2000).
64
 See David P. Reed, Why spectrum is not property - the case for an entirely new regime of wireless 
communications policy (2001), available at 
http://www.reed.com/dprframeweb/dprframe.asp?section=paper&fn=openspec.html, cited in Werbach, supra note 
50.
65
 Werbach, supra note 50, fn. 116, at 886.
66
 See id., at 866, at 881 and at 885.
67 Id., at 885.
68 See id., at 914.
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Spectrum policy falls victim to several fallacies.  Each is demonstrably false, yet remarkably 
durable. The most damaging is the notion that there is such a thing as spectrum and that it behaves 
as a fixed physical resource like land. Establishing a legal regime under such a misconception is like 
sailing west from Europe to find a shorter trade route to India.  You might find something 
interesting along the way, but you will never achieve your objective.69
This article reengages this debate by suggesting that while the connection to land may not be 
strong, there is another natural resource with many attributes similar to spectrum: water.70
IV. Description of Riparian and Prior Appropriation Water Doctrines
In the United States, management of water resources has generally been under either the riparian 
doctrine or the prior appropriation doctrine.  Under riparian doctrine, only those who own waterfront 
property may use water from that source, and the water may only be used on the property itself.  This 
immediately limits competition for supply, and puts a premium on access.  In addition to the onsite 
requirement, only ‘reasonable uses’ are permitted.71  ‘Reasonable use’ is defined by courts in a case-by-
case manner.  While a few uses are inherently reasonable (domestic and on-site uses), most of the time, 
whether a particular use is reasonable depends on a comparison to other uses.72  Any downstream 
riparian has a claim against an upstream user for unreasonable use.  So long as the use is reasonable, one 
may use as much as one wants—even to the extent of denying water to downstream users.
Riparian doctrine is derived from old English law, and has many features that make it 
problematic in a modern urbanized society, subject to significant scarcities in water resources.  First, the 
lack of a first-in-time provision in riparianism discourages investment, as a later upstream use may 
devalue your investment by reducing water supply.  The most upstream users may have little incentive 
to invest in industry, as they may be required to cede their usage to domestic and agricultural users 
downstream.  Second, transferring a water right involves transfer of the underlying land—often an 
expensive and unwanted requirement.  And because the right itself is difficult to quantify, the fair 
market price for the land and its accompanying right is also difficult to establish.  Third, it promotes 
69 Id., at 882.
70
 For more on the similarities between spectrum and water, including the nature of rights to these resources as 
usufructuary as noted by Coase, see section V infra.
71
 Reasonable use is determined by comparing the benefit derived from the use with “the extent of detriment to 
[other] riparian proprietors.”  Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459 (1856).
72
 Historically, on-site domestic uses are per se reasonable and are of highest priority.  Closely thereafter are 
agricultural uses.  Other uses—industry, transport, and the like—must give way to higher priority uses when 
water demand exceeds supply.  More recently, many states have adopted legislative definitions of what is 
considered ‘reasonable use’.
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waste: riparian users have no incentive to conserve, and nonriparians may not use any remaining water 
even if it is wasted.73,74  Finally, it is significantly inefficient in assigning use; each dispute requires 
complex analysis of every use on the entire water body, and every change in use may lead to a new 
allocation of rights.75  Recently, in response to some of these problems, some riparian states have moved 
toward a regulated riparian model.  In regulated riparian states, permits are only required for major water 
users, while smaller users may make unpermitted withdrawals. 
Under prior appropriation doctrine, a new user may appropriate unused water by applying for a 
permit to use.76  Once a permit has been granted and use has begun, he ‘owns’ the right to use that 
amount of water at that site of withdrawal, and, subject to certain legislative restrictions, may transfer it 
to others without transferring the underlying land.77  Unlike riparianism, appropriation is first-in-time,
first-in-right: early appropriators are senior to those who come later, and in times of drought, may use 
their full appropriation to the exclusion of all junior members.78
Appropriation doctrine addresses many of the criticisms of riparianism.  By providing a clear and 
enforceable right to use water, it allows for investment without regard for later users’ behavior.  By the 
process of registration, it allows the permitting body to bestow use rights with some regard for the 
common good.  The clear rights structure greatly speeds resolution of disputes, and allows for accurate 
valuation of water rights.  Furthermore, the permitting process allows for public input and control over 
water users.  
73
 Although from a legal standpoint wasteful uses are not beneficial, the legal definition of ‘waste’ is extremely 
limited, and much of what an ordinary man would consider wasteful is not covered.
74
 A spectrum equivalent is a permit for transmission power.  If the goal of a station to is transmit traffic data by 
AM radio to the city of Providence, and a permit is obtained for a 10kW station, there is a possibility that the 
allowed transmission power will be higher than needed in that limited area.  Although the higher power results in 
more interference for other users—needlessly ‘snatching’ a piece of the commons—there is no incentive to reduce 
power in an appropriative model.
75
 There are similarities to the supercommons model of Werbach, supra note 50.
76
 Generally, an appropriation requires imminent actual use of the water, as opposed to long term future planned 
use.
77
 Many other restrictions apply in different states.  One notable example is a ‘use restriction’, which might affect 
the conversion of water rights from agricultural use to industry use.  This allows transfers in general and 
encourages efficient use within certain communities, while protecting economically undervalued uses that the 
public values for other reasons.   See, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Assn. v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 
46 (1999).  Similarly, restricting certain spectrum ‘space’ to certain types of transmissions—broadcast radio, for 
example—ensures the existence of radio stations even if better uses exist from a purely economical standpoint.
78
 This is the classical appropriations approach; modern cases sometimes give deference to growing domestic 
needs.
16
Yet the relatively high transaction costs to control and maintain an efficient rights structure 
preclude its adoption outside the arid West.  Appropriation states frequently suffer from over-
appropriation, where early measures of water flow were later found to overstate the amount available.79
V. Similarities between Spectrum and Water Resources
In this section, we describe the strong similarities between the telecommunications spectrum and 
water resources as resources; between the commons approach to spectrum and riparian water rights; and 
between the property rights approach to spectrum and the appropriation doctrine for water rights.  Due 
to these similarities, we conjecture that our history with these property systems for water have 
significant lessons for the pressures and transitions we may expect in implementing property systems for 
the telecommunications spectrum.
V.A. Similarities as a Resource
Spectrum and water share a number of characteristics as natural resources.  For many natural 
resources, such as oil and gas, use of a portion of the resource by one user prevents another user from 
using that particular portion.  However, for spectrum and water, multiple users can use the same portion 
of the resource.  For instance, the 2.4 GHz band of telecommunication spectrum is used by a number of 
different technologies: cordless phones, wireless internet access, and even microwave ovens.  While 
conflicts may arise if all of these technologies are being used locally and simultaneously, sequences of 
uses of the same bandwidth by different users are compatible.
Similarly, water resources can also be used by many different users.  A reservoir can offer 
opportunities for boating, swimming, and fishing, in addition to providing drinking water.  Additionally, 
water in an aqueduct that is being delivered to one farmer can help propel (through increased flow) 
delivery to another farmer.  Even water that is diverted and “used” by one farmer may still be used by 
another farmer who is downstream, through what is known as “return flow.”80
This multiple-use characteristic has important ramifications.  Economists call resources that can 
be used by only a single user “exhaustible,” whereas resources that can be used by multiple users (up to 
a point) are “non-exhaustible.”  Non-exhaustible resources are a category of what economists call 
79
 The total appropriations for the Colorado River, for example, far exceed the total flow.  The river flows to the 
sea primarily because these appropriations are restricted by environmental and treaty concerns.
80
 Return flow is the quantity of water that returns to a water body through runoff, percolation, or other means 
after it has been diverted.  Also, see Figure 1.
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“public goods.”81 Economists generally believe that resources that are not public goods are best 
allocated through a system of private property rights.  However, complications arise with public goods, 
and it is difficult to determine the best way to allocate resources that are public goods.82 Thus, because 
both spectrum and water can be used by multiple users, they will share similar issues in determining 
appropriate allocation systems.
Another similarity between spectrum and water is their mixed ownership structures.  Some 
resources are owned by private individuals (again, such as oil and gas), while others are owned entirely 
by the public (such as air).  Both spectrum and water have an ownership structure that is partially private 
and partially public.  For spectrum, many broadcasters have exclusive licenses to the use of a certain 
bandwidth in a locality.  However, the government maintains its “ownership” of even these licensed 
bandwidths, and designates certain bandwidths for free use of the entire public.
Similarly, many irrigators and industrial users have private rights to put specific water to 
reasonable and beneficial uses.83 On the other hand, in many states, these rights are subject to what is 
known as the “public trust doctrine.”  Under this doctrine, “The waters of the State ... are a natural 
resource owned by the State in trust for the public and subject to the State’s sovereign power to plan, 
regulate, and control the withdrawal and use of those waters, under law, in order to protect the public 
health, safety, and welfare.”84 Thus, ownership of water is also shared between private individuals and 
the public.
This characteristic of shared ownership again has important effects on the determination of 
appropriate allocation structures.  Conflicts between public and private purposes will arise, and the 
allocation structure should include mechanisms for resolving these conflicts.
One other significant characteristic that is present for both spectrum and water is that the rights 
to the resource are “usufructuary” in nature.  A usufructuary right is the right to use the resource, not 
necessarily “possess” the resource.  This characteristic derives fundamentally from the shared ownership 
81
 The other categories are non-excludable resources, from which nobody is excluded once the resource has been 
produced; and resources that are both non-exhaustible and non-excludable.
82
 As evidenced by the commons versus property rights debate for telecommunications spectrum.
83
 Beneficial use is a requirement that a particular use must be both “permissible” and “not … wasteful in 
amount.” JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY, AND ROBERT H. ABRAMS, 
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES, 3rd ed.(Hereinafter STLA), 124 (2000).
84
 Dale B. Thompson, Primary Lead, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER 
RIGHTS AND REGULATORY AUTHORITIES, SUBMITTED TO THE RHODE ISLAND WATER 
RESOURCES BOARD (2003) [hereinafter Water Rights Subcommittee Report] 2, citing Regulated Riparian 
Model Water Code (1997).
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characteristic discussed above.85 Spectrum users have the license to use a particular bandwidth.  Water 
users have the right to put certain water to a reasonable and beneficial use.  Again, this shared 
characteristic will help analyze appropriate allocation systems, because a usufructuary right is a more 
narrowly defined right.
Another similarity comes from analysis of groundwater law.86  Groundwater use differs from 
surface water use in that groundwater removal by pumping propagates a ‘dip’ in the subsurface water 
level.  These water level ‘dips’ occur in a fashion and form similar to short range spectrum interference.  
Neighbors who withdraw too much groundwater can force the local water level to drop below the level 
of a user’s well, much as a neighboring transmission can cause local interference.  In response to a drop 
in water level below their existing well, users can dig a deeper well (or in the case of spectrum, increase 
transmission power), which has the dual effect of solving their own personal problem and producing a 
farther-reaching effect on their neighbors.
While spectrum and water do share these characteristics, they do differ in a number of ways. For 
instance, spectrum use is more dependent on technological change.  Managing conflicting water uses 
does rely on the technological aspects of water extraction, application, and runoff and discharge 
management, along with the physics and hydrogeology of water diffusion.  However, the effect on other 
users is not as closely related to the sensitivity of receivers in spectrum usage.  Nonetheless, despite 
these differences, their shared characteristics suggest that analysis of our history with water law can 
improve our understanding of the challenges in developing a property system for spectrum.
V.B. Shared Characteristics of Spectrum Regimes and Water Doctrines
In addition to these similarities as resources, there are other strong similarities between the 
approaches associated with spectrum and water.  The commons approach to spectrum shares many 
characteristics with the riparian doctrine for water rights.  Under the commons approach, ownership of 
equipment for sending or receiving telecommunications broadcasts is required to use spectrum.  
Ownership of this equipment thus serves as a limit on the availability of the commons right to spectrum.  
However, if someone has this equipment, that person is free to use spectrum, subject only to the 
85
 However, it is important to note that these characteristics are not identical, because shared ownership could 
have led to a different parsing of the right.
86
 Although groundwater doctrine is not as established and is not well suited to a national frequency allocation 
analysis, a later investigation of groundwater law may be useful in establishing functional rules for local 
interference.
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constraints of tort law.  Under tort law, behavior is constrained by the “reasonable person”87 standard.  
Thus, under the commons approach, spectrum is allocated only to those who own the necessary 
equipment, and is allocated between different users and uses through the application of the reasonable 
person standard.
Under the riparian doctrine, ownership of riparian land is required to use water.  Ownership of 
this land thus serves as a limit to the riparian right to water.  However, if someone owns riparian land, 
that person is free to use water, subject only to the “reasonable use” doctrine.  Thus, under the riparian 
doctrine, water is allocated only to those who own riparian land, and is allocated between different users 
and uses through the application of the reasonable use doctrine.  The similarities between the commons 
approach and riparian doctrine are therefore strong, and much can be learned about the commons 
approach by examining the history of the riparian doctrine.
Moreover, the property rights approach to spectrum shares many characteristics with the 
appropriation doctrine for water rights.  Under the property rights approach, someone wishing to have a 
guaranteed right to use spectrum must obtain a permit to do so.  Ownership of equipment is insufficient.  
Once somebody has a permit, they are free to use the spectrum, subject to the conditions of their permit.  
Furthermore, subject to oversight by a regulatory agency, somebody with a spectrum permit can transfer 
her right to use spectrum.  Also, under the Faulhaber and Farber idea of an implied non-interference 
easement, while someone who owns a permit has a guaranteed right to use spectrum, if that person is not 
using their designated portion of the spectrum at some particular time, then others have right to use that 
spectrum, because they will not be interfering with the permit owners’ right to use that spectrum.
Meanwhile, under the appropriations doctrine, someone wishing to have a right to use water 
must obtain a permit to do so.  Ownership of land is insufficient.  Once somebody has a permit, they are 
allowed to take water and use it, subject to the conditions of their permit.  Furthermore, in many 
jurisdictions,88 subject to oversight by a regulatory agency, somebody with an appropriative permit can 
transfer their right to use water.  Also, under the appropriations doctrine, if someone with an 
appropriative permit is not using their water, that water is then freed for others to appropriate.
While there are these similarities, there is one important distinction between the property rights 
approach and appropriation doctrine.  In spectrum, we had the advantage of having extra resource 
available: as technology improved, more spectrum became available to allocate to new users.  Hence, we 
87
 A reasonable person takes the care that a care that a person of ordinary prudence would use in the same 
circumstances.  See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 7th ed., 155 (2000).
88
 See STLA, supra note 83, at 223-254.
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were able to put up this extra spectrum for auction for new users.89 As a result, we have not needed to 
initiate markets and transfers initially.
On the other hand, water resources in the Western United States have been significantly 
constrained.   As a result, there has been a strong need for markets and transfers of some water rights. 
Nonetheless, the surplus of currently available spectrum is ending.  Even if additional 
technological advances could provide more spectrum, if one believes in Say’s law - that supply creates 
its own demand, then even this new surplus will also end, and the two situations become more similar 
again.  As a result, the similarities between the property rights approach and appropriation doctrine 
remain strong.  Much can then be learned about the property rights approach by examining the history of 
the appropriation doctrine.
VI. Lessons from Water Law for Spectrum
Because of these similarities, there are many insights to spectrum policy we can gain from our 
analysis of our history with water law. 
VI.A. Transitions from Pure Property Rights Systems
One of these insights is the possible impediment to the transferability of spectrum property rights 
presented by third parties. The free transferability of spectrum rights is one of the most important 
justifications of the efficiency of the property rights system.90  For instance, consider the following 
example. Alice is the current holder of the right to use a certain band of spectrum. Alice runs a business 
that generates a significant profit, and that must have this band of spectrum to operate. The value of this 
right to use spectrum to Alice is the present net value of her profits from operating this business, which 
is one million dollars ($1,000,000).  However, Bob wants to start a new business that would also need to 
use this same band of spectrum to operate. The value of this spectrum to Bob is one and a half million 
dollars ($1,500,000). 
If the property right to use this band of spectrum is freely transferable, Alice could sell this right, 
say for $1,300,000. This sale is favorable to both Alice and Bob, because Alice is being paid more than 
the right is worth to her, and Bob is paying less than the right is worth to him. Society also benefits from 
this sale. To calculate social welfare, we add the values to the different individuals in society. The value 
89
 See note 2 supra.
90
 Increasing the incentive to invest to improve the value of the right is the other most important justification.
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to society of the right before the sale is its value to Alice, $1,000,000. However, after the sale, Alice 
now has $1,300,000 cash, and Bob has a net benefit from the sale of $200,000 (which is his value, 
$1,500,000 minus the price he paid, $1,300,000). Adding the two together, we see that the value of the 
right to society after the sale is $1,500,000. Thus, social welfare has thus increased by $500,000 because 
of this sale. This increase is equal to the sum of the increased value to Alice ($300,000) plus the net 
benefit to Bob ($200,000). 
In a similar manner, any trade that will make both parties better off will also benefit society. 
Social welfare will improve by the sum of the two parties’ benefits from the trade.  As a result, the 
transferability of spectrum rights seems to make a property rights regime an efficient approach.
Over the past 100 years, we have had some experiences with transfers of appropriative rights to 
water.  One place where there has been significant interest in water transfers is California.  In California, 
much of the rights to the first priorities in water allocation are held by farmers, while urban areas
regularly have much lower priority.  Consequently, during extended droughts, such as the 1987-1992 
drought, there is significant interest in transfers between farmers with first priority to water and cities 
that have access to much less water but do have significant funds to purchase water if it would be made 
available through water markets.
While there has been significant interest in water markets, there have been significantly fewer 
transfers of water rights than might be expected.91 A primary reason for this lack of transfers is the 
institutional protection of “third parties” to water transfers.  Water transfers occur directly between two 
parties - the buyer and seller.  However, a wide variety of “third parties” also may be affected by these 
transfers.  Early on, it was recognized that the rights of junior appropriators who took advantage of the 
non-use of water by senior appropriators may be harmed by the transfer of a senior appropriator’s water 
right.  Additionally, downstream users of an upstream appropriator’s “return flow” would also be 
harmed if the upstream appropriator was allowed to transfer her entire appropriative water right.92
More recently, new third-party concerns have been raised about communities affected by “out-
of-basin” water transfers.93 The most famous such case is that of the Owens Valley community in 
91
 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 673 
(1993).
92 See figure 2.
93 See Joseph Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatization of Water 1 WEST-
NORTHWEST 13 (1994); Barton Thompson, Water Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph Sax’s Water 
Scholarship, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363 (1998); both cited in STLA, supra note 83, at 249.   Also, see A. Dan 
Tarlock, New Water Transfer Restrictions: The West Returns to Riparianism, 27 WATER RESOURCES RES. 
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California.  This case forms the background of the movie Chinatown94 and is also discussed in Marc 
Reisner’s novel, Cadillac Desert.95  The Owens Valley was once a fertile agricultural area.  However, 
through a number of machinations, the City of Los Angeles acquired the rights to Owens Valley water, 
and constructed a long aqueduct to access this water.  Consequently, almost no water remained for use 
by Owens Valley residents, and all farming and development left the Owens Valley.96 This incident 
continues to cast a large shadow over all water transfers in California.
As a result of these concerns, a number of procedural barriers to water transfers have been put in 
place to protect third parties.97  A party wishing to transfer her right must prove that this water satisfies 
“historical use,”98 in order to protect those junior appropriators who invested in reliance on the non-use 
of senior appropriators.  Furthermore, transfers may also be limited to “consumptive use,”99 to protect 
downstream users of upstream return flow.  These protections arise generally under the “no injury” rule, 
which says that “a proposed change will be approved only if it will not injure junior appropriators.”100
Meanwhile, to protect communities, most transfers101 require approval through a lengthy, formal 
application process.  During this process, communities and other users have the opportunity to file 
protests against a proposed transfer.102  Even if a transfer is initially approved, there is a possibility that 
the board may then “reconsider” the transfer and deny it later.  This extremely lengthy, cumbersome, 
and risky process has been a significant barrier to the free transferability of appropriative water 
permits.103
987(1991); Committee on Western Water Management, National Research Council, Water Transfers in the West:  
Efficiency, Equity, and the Environment (1992); and Dale B. Thompson, Defining a New Market for a Common 
Resource: Lessons from the 1991-92 California Drought Water Bank, unpublished manuscript (1992).
94 Roman Polanski, director, CHINATOWN (1974).
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(1993).
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Returning to our prior example of a spectrum transfer, we see that third party concerns could 
affect the efficiency of a spectrum transfer.  Earlier, we found that, from society’s perspective 
considering only the effect on Alice and Bob, social welfare would be increased by $500,000 by the 
transfer from Alice to Bob.  However, let us now add in the effect of this transfer on third parties.  
Alice’s customer, Charlie, had made a significant investment in technology to utilize a service provided 
by Alice’s band of spectrum.  Bob’s use of this spectrum will conflict with Charlie’s use, and 
consequently, Bob will not allow Charlie to use this spectrum.  As a result, Charlie will have to find an 
alternative band of spectrum for his service, and will need to invest an additional $900,000 in 
technology to receive the same quality service as he previously had while using Alice’s band of 
spectrum.
This additional cost to Charlie therefore represents a $900,000 opportunity cost of this transfer, 
and will reduce social welfare after the transfer to $600,000 (= previous social value of $1,500,000 
minus the $900,000 opportunity cost).  As a result, social welfare is actually reduced by $400,000 (= the 
prior social value of $1,000,000 minus the net-after social value of $600,000) by the transfer between 
Alice and Bob.  Nonetheless, if Charlie has no right to object to this transfer, it will go through because 
both Alice and Bob individually benefit from it.  This example and our history with water transfers 
therefore suggest that a property rights regime for spectrum rights should pay careful attention to the 
effects of third parties from transfers of spectrum rights.  When these third party effects are taken into 
consideration, the efficiency advantages of the property rights system may be significantly limited.
Questions then arise as to who the third parties to transfers of spectrum rights would be, and in 
what situations would these third party effects be significant?  Our hypothetical example suggests one 
possible third party group: licensed users of a particular band of spectrum who have made significant 
investments in technological equipment to utilize that band of spectrum, where their use will not be 
permitted after the transfer of the spectrum right.  For example, many people have made significant 
investments in cellular phones that utilize a certain band of spectrum currently controlled by Verizon.  If 
some other company were to offer Verizon an extremely large sum of money to transfer this right, our 
experience with water markets suggests that in addition to considering the effects on the profits of 
Verizon, the concerns of third parties that have made significant investments in Verizon cellular phones 
should also be considered before approval of this transfer.
These concerns could lead to a future transition away from a property system for spectrum based 
on the property-rights approach.  As in the case with water, third parties may turn to the legal system or 
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the political system to enjoin, delay, or block a proposed transfer.104  An administrative institution may 
then arise in response to these concerns.  This institution would include a procedural mechanism for 
reviewing the effects of transfers on third parties.  As a result, this procedural mechanism for protecting 
third party rights may become an important component of a property-rights-based system for spectrum.
This mechanism may have significant effects on the efficiency of the property rights system.  In 
addition to the transaction costs of operating this mechanism, a significant number of trades would not 
occur, as suggested by our experience with water markets.  While this mechanism might prevent some 
trades that were on balance, a net detriment to social welfare due to their third party impacts, it is likely 
that a large number of socially beneficial trades will be prevented due to the individual parties concerns 
with the lengthy, cumbersome, and risky process of spectrum rights transfer approval.  In the end, this 
mechanism might curtail trades to the point that, after this transition, the property-rights system for 
spectrum might look very similar to the allocation system we currently use for spectrum.
VI.B. Transitions from Pure Commons Systems
Another lesson we can learn about property systems for spectrum is how a commons approach 
might adapt to increasing scarcity.  One argument for utilizing a commons approach now is that if 
conditions change, it may be easier to transition from a commons to a property rights approach, in 
contrast to the difficulty of transitioning from a property rights to a commons approach.  This argument 
recognizes that it may be possible that there may come a time in which high-valued uses of spectrum 
may not be well-served by a commons approach, perhaps due to interference.105  This argument suggests 
that the governing system for the spectrum commons will then enable the creation of a niche of 
spectrum that will then be governed by a property rights approach.  This would then result in a hybrid 
approach to spectrum.
104
 Some may suggest that the political power of third parties may be limited because as a group of consumers, 
they may face high organizational costs and have little information.  See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC 
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problem of over-utilization leading to interference under a commons.
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However, our experience with transitions in water law suggests that the transition will not be to 
this hybrid approach, but rather to a regulated commons.  The riparian system has undergone many 
transitions over time.  One significant transition was when water law was initially established in the 
Western United States.  Initially, the doctrine applied for water rights in the West was the riparian 
doctrine, which was then used in the Eastern United States.  However, the inappropriateness of the 
riparian doctrine in the arid West quickly became clear, and the prior appropriation doctrine was instead 
developed and implemented in Western states.
Two different approaches to this transition were tried.  One was to completely abolish existing 
riparian rights, and implement a rights system based only on prior appropriations.  The leading state that 
took this approach was Colorado.106  The other was to adopt a hybrid approach where existing riparian 
rights would continue to be recognized, but that all new water rights would be under the prior 
appropriations doctrine.  The leading state in the hybrid approach was California.
Our experience in operating the hybrid approach in California suggests that attempting to 
transition from a commons to a hybrid approach for spectrum may be troublesome.  In California, 
conflicts between appropriators and riparians arose, and led to significant political battles, which was 
highlighted in the 1884 case Lux v. Haggin,107 where the California Supreme Court first found for the 
riparian interest.  This decision “set off a political fire storm.”108 The public outcry convinced the court 
to vacate its earlier decision and rehear the case.  Nonetheless, the court then again upheld the rights of 
the riparians over the appropriators.109
In later years, the problem of unexercised riparian rights that would have priority over all 
appropriative rights generated significant risk for appropriators in California.  In 1913, the California 
legislature attempted to abolish unexercised riparian rights, but this statute was later ruled 
unconstitutional.110 Only more recently has California found a solution to this problem, where 
unexercised riparian rights in adjudicated water bodies are not abolished but are instead given priority 
lower than previously established appropriative rights.111
Our more recent experiences with riparian transitions suggest that, instead of transitioning to a 
hybrid property rights - commons property system, the more likely response to increased scarcity would 
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be to transition from a commons system to a regulated commons.  While initially, Eastern states in the 
United States seemed to have plentiful water, over the past fifty years, the pressures of extended 
droughts and the rapid increase of urban populations has put significant pressure on allocations derived 
from the riparian system.  Consequently, over the past twenty-five years, a number of eastern states have 
adopted a form of regulated riparianism, requiring permits for use of water.112  This development has 
been punctuated by the drafting Regulated Riparian Model Water Code.113
An alternative to a regulated riparian system in order to deal with these new stresses would be to 
adopt a property-rights trading system.  However, the principal reason for the movement to a regulated 
riparian system rather than a property-rights/trading system is to reduce the transition costs and risks that 
would result from a shift towards trading.114  A regulated riparian system would functionally operate 
very similar to the previous riparian system, except in times of extended drought.115  As a result, during 
non-drought times, the transition could seem very simple, and investments made under the previous 
riparian system would continue to remain useful.  A trading system could operate very differently in all 
times, and so in comparison, a transition to a regulated riparian system is more attractive.  As a result, 
many of the Eastern states look to a regulated riparian system to address these new stresses on their 
water resources.
This experience suggests that in the future, if “shortages” of spectrum arise under a commons 
approach, the likely response will be to transition to a regulated commons.  Similar to our experience 
with water, a transition to a regulated commons would be more simple than transitioning to a hybrid 
system involving limited trading.  Also, the regulations could also then be designed to protect previous 
investments more fully than under a trading system.  In the face of shortages of spectrum, it is likely that 
groups with significant investments in utilization of that spectrum will be harmed by these shortages.  
These groups may then push for modifications to the spectrum allocation system.  These groups would 
be well organized, and have considerably more political power than other groups who might also have 
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an interest in the response to the shortage.116  These groups can then utilize their power to “capture” the 
administrative agency in charge of regulating the commons.117
Well organized groups would therefore have a strong incentive to push for a regulated commons, 
rather than a market system.  The reason for this is that the operation of a regulatory system enables 
well-organized interest groups to initially influence the design of that system, and continue to exert 
strong influence over the operation of that system.  In contrast, in a market, the influence of these groups 
would be limited to the initial design of a market system, and possibly also enforcement of that system’s 
rules.  As a result, by pushing for a regulated commons, well-organized interest groups with significant 
investments in the use of spectrum could then utilize their political influence to ensure that the system 
would protect their investments.  Thus, both our experiences with water and our current experience with 
spectrum suggest that a commons system, under the pressure of shortages in spectrum, would transition 
to a regulated commons.
This can also be understood with the following example.    In this example, the question is:  how 
would a commons system respond to increasing interference problems that significantly damage the 
usefulness of a very valuable application that utilizes a commons frequency?
Let’s say that some frequency, say 1.8GHz, is a new frequency that is opened to the commons 
approach.  As a result, a few inventors design devices across different applications that communicate 
using this frequency.  Of these applications, let us assume that there are three that are small commercial 
successes, with each of these having a few devices sold and operated (and all others are unsuccessful). 
We also assume that, for each of these applications, the chance of slightly delayed or lost 
communications does not impede their usefulness.118
However, a little later, another inventor also uses this same spectrum portion to design a new 
application.  This application is much more sensitive to interference problems, but initially, the paucity 
of other devices allows interference to be kept to a minimum.  While being very sensitive, this 
116
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application also becomes extremely valuable.119 120  While things operate smoothly for a short period, 
after a little time, the other three applications then become more popular, and more devices using the 1.8 
GHz band begin operating.  The higher utilization of this bandwidth now creates significant interference 
problems for the extremely valuable application, problems that existing technology cannot remedy.  
What will be the response to this situation?
There are four possible responses.  Some might suggest that technology could improve to 
eliminate the interference problem, which would enable us to continue under the pure commons 
approach.  However, as these other devices continue to multiply in the marketplace, the pace of 
technological improvement may be unable to keep up with the pace of interference.
Another response might be for the inventor of this very valuable application to acquire some 
exclusive-rights frequency and redesign the application to utilize that frequency.  However, if 
successful, this response would result in the complete loss of the investment consumers of this 
application121 had made in the purchase and implementation of earlier devices using the commons 
frequency.  Because of the magnitude of this investment, it is politically likely that these consumers 
would successfully push for some alternative response.
Yet another possibility would be to transition this particular commons spectrum frequency into a 
property-rights-based, exclusive-rights frequency.  Under this approach, the government could award 
property rights to the different inventors of the devices that utilize the spectrum, and if the inventor of 
the very valuable application could acquire all of these rights, then the interference problem would be 
solved.  However, there are two problems with this response.  One is the “hold-out” problem: each of 
the other inventors would have a strong incentive to hold-out against selling their right to spectrum, in 
an effort to extract the maximum amount from the inventor of the very valuable application.  The other 
problem is the same problem mentioned above in the property-rights transition section:  “third parties.”  
Under this response, the inventors of the other devices would be compensated, but none of that 
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compensation would then flow to the third-party purchasers of the less-valuable devices.122  Just as in 
the case with water, a transition like this that deprived these third parties of all economically viable use 
of their prior investments in these devices may lead to takings claims against the government.123  This 
response therefore seems likely to be either ineffective, or politically and legally problematic.
In the end, just as has happened with riparian systems, the most likely response seems to be that 
regulations would be applied to this frequency to reduce the impact of interference problems.  Both the 
vendor and the customers of the extremely valuable application would have strong incentives to lobby 
for regulations that would protect their use of this portion of the spectrum.  And so the likely outcome in 
this case is to transition to a regulated commons.
Consequently, a likely transition to a regulated commons presents an argument against adopting 
the commons approach for spectrum.  The one thing that both property rights advocates and commons 
advocates seem to agree upon is the inappropriateness of the current regulatory system for allocating 
spectrum.   However, there might be significant similarities between how the current FCC regulatory 
system operates and how a regulated commons system would operate.  In the end, a transition to a 
regulated commons could end up looking similar to our current system, with all of its associated 
problems.
VI.C. An Alternative Structure to Enable More Flexibility to Respond to Transitional Forces
Thus, we learn two major lessons from water law.  Our first lesson is based on experiences with 
prior appropriation doctrine.  These experiences suggest that concerns about “third party” effects could 
be very detrimental to the efficiency of a property rights system of spectrum allocation.  These pressures 
would likely lead to a transition to a more regulated system of property rights.  Our second lesson is 
based on experiences with transitions in riparian doctrine.  These transitions suggest that under pressure 
due to scarcity, a commons system for spectrum allocation likely will transition to a regulated commons, 
which could look similar to our current system for commons with all of its attendant problems.  
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Taken together, these lessons suggest additional criticisms of both a property rights approach and 
a commons approach.  Yet our experiences with water law also suggest an alternative structure—one 
that more properly combines aspects of both property rights and commons. 
One of the more interesting recent developments in water law is the Environmental Water 
Account (EWA).  An extremely difficult issue when protecting environmental interests in water bodies 
is the timing of when these interests are most endangered.  While pollutant load124 and pollutant type 
certainly are major factors in protecting environmental interests in waters, the quantity of water in the 
water body itself plays perhaps the most important role.  For many pollutants, a sufficient quantity of 
water can enable dilution to the point that the presence of the pollutants in their diluted state is no longer 
harmful to the environmental interests.125  Therefore, a key factor in the environmental health of a water 
body is often as simple as the quantity of water in it.
Consequently, environmental interests tend to be threatened most during extended droughts, 
which inevitably lead to significant water quantity reductions in water bodies.  We want to be able to 
save more water for these environmental interests during these drought times.  However, unfortunately, 
these periods of extended droughts are precisely the same time when non-environmental interests are 
affected the most by the scarcity of water resources.  In other words, the time when the fish need more 
water the most is exactly the same time that farmers and cities need more water most.  This dilemma 
presents severe obstacles to protecting environmental interests in water bodies.
To deal with this, one approach has been to create what are known as Environmental Water 
Accounts.126  An EWA takes advantage of both temporal and locational flexibility in water resources to 
balance these competing needs for water during water scarcities.  While there is a natural conflict 
between environmental and non-environmental interests for water resources in times of drought, a 
manager of an EWA can nonetheless use temporal transfers of water to protect environmental interests.  
124
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The manager does this by acquiring additional water resources in times of plenty, and then utilizing 
excess capacity in reservoirs to store the water for later use.
Additionally, while environmental interests in water bodies have localized needs for water, i.e. 
water in the Green River does not help fish in the Blue River, non-environmental interests are less 
concerned with where the water came from than with ensuring that the water reaches them.  This 
characteristic provides locational flexibility that the manager of the EWA can utilize to protect 
environmental interests.  For example, two rivers flow through the town of Blackstown, the Green and 
the Blue.  Fish live in the Blue River but not in the Green.  However, the town’s permit specifies that 
withdrawals for the town’s water supplies should occur from the Blue River.  In times of scarce water 
supplies, withdrawals by the town are detrimental to the fish in the Blue River.
On the other hand, the EWA owns rights to withdraw water from the Green River.  To protect 
the fish in the Blue River, when necessary, the manager of the EWA can “trade” withdrawal rights from 
the Green River to the town for its withdrawal rights from the Blue River.127  After this transfer, the 
manager of the EWA can then ensure that the water remains in the Blue River and thereby protect the 
fish in the Blue River.  As this example demonstrates, two important characteristics of EWAs are the 
ability to collect timely information on the precise location of environmental needs for water, and the 
ability to utilize alternative transportation facilities to “wheel” the water involved in a transfer.128
This example suggests an alternative property system to balance the competing interests of 
different users of spectrum: a property rights system involving trading of spectrum rights, and including 
as a significant component a Spectrum Commons Account (SCA).  The way the SCA would work is as 
follows.  Most spectrum would be owned as a private property right, for the use of an individual owner.  
However, one of the owners of spectrum would be the SCA.  Spectrum owned by the SCA could be 
used by anyone, and would thus have the characteristics of a commons.  Meanwhile, the manager of a 
SCA then would buy and sell certain portions of spectrum rights that are available on the general 
spectrum rights market.129
127
 Recall that, due to restraints on transfers arising out of protections for third parties, the operation of an 
appropriation system is very rigid, and this type of transfer would normally not occur without outside 
intervention.
128
 Water “wheeling” refers to using someone else’s facilities to convey marketed water; see STLA, supra note 
83, at 645.
129
 An SCA is similar to the “parks” suggestion of Faulhaber and Farber, supra note 56, in that a portion of the 
spectrum would be utilized as commons under an otherwise property-rights regime.  However, the significant 
difference is that the extent of commons frequencies would be actively managed by SCA managers, including 
possibly selling a formerly commons frequency for exclusive use.
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In doing so, the manager of the SCA can take advantage of flexibilities to provide additional 
spectrum for use as a commons.  Flexibilities in spectrum derive from two sources:  applications where 
interference poses minimal adverse consequences; and devices that are designed (or could be redesigned 
at a very low cost) to enable operation over a wider range of frequencies without any significant loss in 
performance.
There would be two purposes in operating the SCA.  One would be to expand the amount of 
spectrum available as a commons resource.  The other would be to minimize the effects on third parties 
from transfers of spectrum rights.  On this second purpose, it could be important to grant third-parties 
certain statutory rights that would be satisfied through a properly executed SCA operation.  One of the 
important backdrops to EWAs is the Endangered Species Act (ESA).  Certain species of the fish 
protected in the operation of an EWA are also protected under the ESA.  This backdrop provides 
incentives for EWA managers to properly consider the needs of these fish, and for other water users to 
cooperate with EWA managers to prevent outcomes that could lead to litigation under the ESA.  In a 
similar manner, providing third parties certain statutory rights might then provide proper incentives to 
SCA managers, and induce owners of spectrum rights to cooperate with SCA managers before 
conducting frequency transfers that might affect third parties.
One of the important lessons from EWAs is that the manager needs to have complete 
information to properly respond to changing conditions.  Under an SCA, this information would come 
through a registration system.130  In a SCA registration system, the vendor of devices utilizing a 
commons spectrum frequency could decide to register its device with the SCA.  Registration by the 
vendor would entail provision of information about the device, concerning its susceptibility to 
interference problems, and the steps that the vendor would expect would need to occur to enable the 
devices to operate on a different commons frequency.  The benefit for registration would be that a 
vendor could then include a symbol on the device (and in marketing literature) indicating that this device 
had the opportunity of protection under a SCA.131  Consumers of this device could then go on the 
internet to register their own purchase and use of the device.  Consumers that did so would be entitled to 
the “third-party insurance” provided by the SCA.  Registration by both vendors and consumers would 
130
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provide the information an SCA manager would need to determine whether for any proposed purchase 
of commons frequency, the offered price would exceed the costs to all affected parties.
The registration system would also extend to protect third parties to transfers of private spectrum 
rights.  Prior to making a transfer that might violate statutory rights of third parties, as discussed above, 
the holder of a private spectrum right could first approach the SCA manager.   We assume that this 
transfer would damage certain third party interests.  The SCA manager would examine the consequences 
of this transfer on third parties, and then determine the circumstances132 under which the flexibilities of 
the SCA could protect these third parties.  In order to do so, the SCA manager would again need 
registration information from both the vendors and consumers of devices utilizing this frequency.  After 
receiving this information, the SCA manager could then determine whether it would be possible to 
protect the third parties affected by this proposed transfer.  If so, the SCA manager could then give a 
“SCA stamp of approval” to the transfer, which would relieve the trading parties of any liability under 
the third-party protection statute.  The SCA manager would then also be responsible to provide 
registered third parties with equipment133 utilizing a commons spectrum frequency, paid for by the 
former holder of the private spectrum right.  In this manner, the SCA manager could be an important 
party to transfers of private spectrum rights.
An example may better explicate the operation of an SCA.  We shall again consider the example 
of the extremely valuable invention susceptible to interference problems using a commons frequency.  
Whereas under the pure commons system, as discussed above, this would likely lead to a regulated 
commons.  However, an SCA manager would be able to more directly deal with this.  
Consider a portion of spectrum initially operated as a commons, part of an SCA.  A number of 
technologies utilize this frequency.  One of these technologies becomes extremely valuable.  
Furthermore, this particular technology is sensitive to interference from others using the same frequency 
for other technologies.  What can be done?
If this was a traditional commons regime, a technical solution would be the only way for the 
owner of this technology to alleviate this interference problem.  For instance, this technology could be 
utilized by better identifying the source of the signals, and ensuring that this source is desired one.  
Meanwhile, under a mixed commons-property-rights regime as has been discussed previously (CITE), 
where a portion of bandwidth is devoted to commons and another portion devoted to property rights, 
132
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another alternative arises.  The owner of the technology may purchase a portion of the spectrum that 
operates under the property rights regime.  She can then modify the technology to utilize this alternative 
frequency, and then distribute new equipment that used the alternative frequency.
Under a SCA, yet another opportunity arises.134  The owner of the technology can approach the 
manager of the SCA, and suggest that she might be interested in acquiring an exclusive right to utilize 
this frequency.  The SCA manager will then investigate the costs of moving other users of this commons 
frequency to another frequency.  These costs include both the costs of acquiring other spectrum 
frequencies to use as commons for these users, and the costs of developing and distributing new 
equipment for these individual users.135  The owner of the technology could then determine whether this 
option would be the best response to the interference problem.  If so, the owner would then pay the 
required compensation to the manager of the SCA, and would then acquire an exclusive right to use this 
frequency. As long as this new technology was valuable enough to make this transfer feasible, the net 
result of this flexibility is the opportunity to properly respond to the problem of interference suffered by 
a valuable technology that utilized a commons frequency. Why would this be necessary?  The answer 
lies with risk and how technological development occurs.  Most of the time, technological development 
is not a completely foreseeable activity.  Promising technologies may go nowhere, and seemingly 
pedantic technologies may be runaway hits.136  As a result, the planning and financing process is never 
completely clear.
Furthermore, technological development frequently occurs in stages.  For example, multiple 
editions of software are frequently released.137  While each of these stages may not be a revolutionary 
change,138 each evolutionary stage requires considerable amounts of investment to be successful.  
Because of the uncertainty and risk involved, it may be impossible to foresee whether this investment 
will be a good one.  It is therefore unlikely that a risky investment by an innovator with no financial 
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backing would secure financing for secondary and tertiary development stages before implementing the 
primary stage.
So what does this mean for an SCA?  What this suggests is that there is a possibility that one of 
the many innovators developing new technologies that utilize a commons frequency may develop an 
extremely valuable technology.  It is unlikely that the true value of this technology could be ascertained 
prior to implementation.  Could the innovator attract additional financing to refine this technology?
Let’s consider a technology sensitive to interference.  If the innovator could alter the frequency 
used by the technology, then the innovator could acquire a frequency operating under an exclusive 
license.  The innovator could therefore solve the interference problem by switching the frequency used.  
With this problem solved, the innovator would more likely attract financing.
However, if design and usability standards required the continued use of the same frequency, it is 
unlikely under a commons approach that the innovator would attract the needed financing.  This is 
because it is unlikely that the innovator would be able to convince all users of the commons frequency to 
yield exclusive control.
On the other hand, the SCA provides another option for the innovator.  If the innovator can 
comply with the required terms set by the SCA manager,139 the innovator can gain exclusive control 
over the frequency.  With exclusive control, this technology becomes more attractive for financing 
additional refinements.
Consequently, the flexibility offered under an SCA will provide a stronger incentive to 
develop140 more valuable technologies.  Meanwhile, portions of spectrum would always be available as 
commons to enable those wishing to experiment with a new technology the opportunity to do so.
The SCA can therefore serve to alleviate some of the detrimental effects of a property-rights-
trading system, while enabling the market for spectrum rights to operate, thereby providing the 
efficiency advantages of this system along with incentives to invest in improving the value of rights to 
use spectrum.
139
 In essence, this is like the liability rule option under the Calabresi-Melamed framework.  See Guido Calabresi 
and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. R. 1089 (1972). What is essential under both this situation and under the liability rule is that an 
external source sets the terms of the bargain rather than the parties themselves.  When the parties are responsible 
for setting the terms, as under the property rule option, hold-outs can result.  Under the Calabresi-Melamed 
framework, the external source is the court, while here, it is the SCA manager.
140
 Also important is the incentive to make additional investments in refining a technology using a commons 
frequency.  An initial success may therefore spur additional investment in improving the technology.
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VII. Conclusion
In examining the debate over whether the appropriate property system for spectrum should be 
based on a property-rights approach or a commons approach, we should also consider the transitions 
these property systems may undergo as they respond to changes in conditions or internal contradictions.  
Looking at the future is an inherently difficult task, and so this article instead looks to the past – in 
particular our prior experience with water law – to learn more about a possible future for spectrum.  This 
article examines a number of strong similarities between water resources and doctrines, and spectrum 
resources and doctrines, to establish the relevance of our past with water as a guide to the future of 
spectrum.
The lessons we draw from water law suggest the following irony:  the transitions that property 
systems, based either on a property-rights approach or a commons approach, may undertake could leave 
these systems looking fairly similar to our current property system for spectrum: FCC regulation.  Just 
as we have seen in the limited development of water markets under prior appropriation, the need to 
protect third-party interests from transfers of spectrum property rights could lead to procedural 
mechanisms that could effectively quash many of these spectrum trades before they occur.  Furthermore, 
just as we have seen riparian doctrine states respond to new scarcity in water resources by transitioning 
to a regulated riparian system, we could also expect that a commons-based property system for spectrum 
would also respond to an inevitable scarcity in spectrum by transitioning to a regulated commons 
system.
Thus, regardless of whether we choose to adopt a system for spectrum based on property rights, 
or one based on commons, future transitions to these systems could leave us back where we started: a 
property system similar to FCC regulation, with all of its associated problems.  The following table 
summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of property rights and commons approaches for spectrum, 
and the transitional pressures and outcomes that may result from use of these approaches:
Property 
System
Flexibility in 
Responding to 
Interference 
Problems 
Provides Capability and 
Incentives to Innovate 
for the Following 
Groups
Transitional Pressure Transitional 
Outcome
Property 
Rights
Can respond 
through both 
technological 
solutions and 
market mechanisms
Well-financed innovators 
expecting very large 
returns
Possibly detrimental 
effects on third parties 
from frequency license 
transfers
Regulatory 
oversight of 
frequency 
transfers
Commons Can only respond A wider range of Possible interference Regulatory 
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through 
technological 
solutions
innovators, including 
those without the 
financing to acquire 
licenses under the 
property right regime
effects on very valuable 
use of commons 
frequency
oversight of 
commons 
frequency
Table 2: Advantages, Disadvantages, & Transitions for Property Rights and Commons in 
Spectrum
To find some solution to this conundrum, an alternative is suggested by our recent experience 
with Environmental Water Accounts (EWA).  While operating in a property-rights-trading based 
system, EWA provide commons benefits for environmental interests in water bodies.  In a similar 
manner, this article proposes the development of Spectrum Commons Accounts (SCA).  Similar to 
EWA, SCA would operate within a property-rights-trading based system for spectrum.  Through the 
SCA, significant portions of the spectrum would be acquired for use as commons, and also to protect 
third-party interests.  However, by operating through a baseline market system, this property system can 
use market signals to respond to scarcities of spectrum, and so the imposition of regulatory controls 
would be unnecessary.  Thus, a property system involving SCA could offer the advantages of both 
property rights and commons for spectrum.  The following table summarizes these features of Spectrum 
Commons Accounts:
Property 
System
Flexibility in 
Responding 
to 
Interference 
Problems 
Provides Capability 
and Incentives to 
Innovate for the 
Following Groups
Transitional 
Pressures
Outcome Utilizing 
Flexibility of SCA
(No Transition 
Needed)
Possibly detrimental 
effects on third parties 
from frequency license 
transfers
SCA manager will 
provide funds for 
purchases of new 
equipment and new 
spectrum frequencies
Spectrum 
Commons 
Accounts
Can respond 
through both 
technological 
solutions and 
market 
mechanisms
A wide range of 
innovators, including 
those without the 
financing to acquire 
licenses under the 
property right regime Possible interference 
effects on very valuable 
use of commons 
frequency
SCA manager can 
negotiate the purchase 
of a commons 
spectrum frequency 
by the owner of a very 
valuable use of that 
frequency
Table 3: Spectrum Commons Accounts Provide Advantages of Commons and Property Rights, 
and Respond to Transitional Pressures
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This article has applications beyond water and spectrum.  Spectrum Commons Accounts are a 
form of marketable commons property.  As a new fourth category of property systems,141 marketable 
commons property enables us to better achieve our objectives depending on circumstances.  Water law 
utilizes all four categories:  property rights in prior appropriations doctrine, commons in riparian 
doctrine, inherently public in the public trust doctrine, and marketable commons in Environmental 
Water Accounts.
Recognizing the possibility of this new category will provide opportunities to better manage 
other resources.  Utilizing the marketable commons system will be best under the following conditions:
(1) organization under a commons approach in most cases is necessary to achieve the primary 
objective of managing the resource;
(2) in rare situations, internal or external conditions may make the application of the commons 
approach extremely costly for a particular participant; and
(3) that participant detrimentally affected could assert political power that would lead to a 
transition away from a pure commons system.
Under these conditions, use of a marketable commons property system will enable the achievement of 
the innovation and distribution advantages offered by the commons approach.  At the same time, the 
possibility of having an extremely costly conflict is eliminated by making the entire system responsive 
to market signals.  Marketable commons property will thus likely find many applications beyond water 
law and telecommunications spectrum.
141 See Table 1.
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Figure 1: Diagram showing effects on stream flow from diversion and return flow
Initial Flow: 100 
acre-feet (af)
Diversion of 
50 af
Consumptive 
Use of 30 af
Return Flow of 
20 af
Flow after 
diversion: 50 af
Flow after return 
flow reenters
stream: 70 af
STREAM
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Figure 2: Diagram showing effect of available water to Farm B after a transfer from Farm A to 
Factory C.  Due to a difference in return flow, water available to Farm B has reduced from 30af to 
10af.
Initial Flow: 50 af
Diversion: 50 af
Return Flow: 30 af
Diversion: 30 af
Diversions before Transfer
Initial Flow: 50 af
Diversion: 0 af
Diversion: 50 af
Diversion: 10 af
Return Flow: 10 af
Diversions after Transfer from A to C
A A
B B
C
